



Mark Scheme (Results)

June 2024

Pearson Edexcel International
Advanced Level in History (WHI04/1D)

Paper 4: International Study with
Historical Interpretations

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War
in Asia, 1945–90

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General Marking Guidance

- All candidates must receive the same treatment. Examiners must mark the first candidate in exactly the same way as they mark the last.
- Mark schemes should be applied positively. Candidates must be rewarded for what they have shown they can do rather than penalised for omissions.
- Examiners should mark according to the mark scheme not according to their perception of where the grade boundaries may lie.
- There is no ceiling on achievement. All marks on the mark scheme should be used appropriately.
- All the marks on the mark scheme are designed to be awarded. Examiners should always award full marks if deserved, i.e. if the answer matches the mark scheme. Examiners should also be prepared to award zero marks if the candidate's response is not worthy of credit according to the mark scheme.
- Where some judgement is required, mark schemes will provide the principles by which marks will be awarded and exemplification may be limited.
- When examiners are in doubt regarding the application of the mark scheme to a candidate's response, the team leader must be consulted.
- Crossed out work should be marked UNLESS the candidate has replaced it with an alternative response.

Generic Level Descriptors for Paper 4

Section A

Targets: AO1 (5 marks): Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

AO3 (20 marks): Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	1–4	• Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included and presented as information, rather than being linked with the extracts. • Judgement on the view is assertive, with little supporting evidence.
2	5–8	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate. • Mostly accurate knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth. It is added to information from the extracts, but mainly to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included. • A judgement on the view is given with limited support, but the criteria for judgement are left implicit.
3	9–14	• Demonstrates understanding and some analysis of the extracts by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences. • Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and discussion of the extracts is attempted. A judgement is given, although with limited substantiation, and is related to some key points of view in the extracts.
4	15–20	• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised within them and by a comparison of them. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to explore most of the relevant aspects of the debate, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge. • Valid criteria by which the view can be judged are established and applied and the evidence provided in the extracts discussed in the process of coming to a substantiated overall judgement, although treatment of the extracts may be uneven. Demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.

5	21–25	• Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors. • Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to explore fully the matter under debate. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments. • A sustained evaluative argument is presented, applying valid criteria and reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of historical debate.
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Section B

Target: A01 (25 marks): Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	1–4	• Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. • The overall judgement is missing or asserted. • There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	5–8	• There is some analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited support and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	9–14	• There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although some mainly descriptive passages may be included. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. • The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence or precision.
4	15–20	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. • The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence or precision.

5	21–25	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis and discussion of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. • The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.
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Section A: Indicative content

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the USA was to blame for the stalemate in Korean peace negotiations in the years 1951-53. In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • The Truman administration made a decision to prolong the Korean war in order to further US global foreign policy • The US did not accept the Soviet proposal of a peace initiative put forward in June 1951, despite it being very similar to the final armistice of 1953 • The Truman administration felt that ending the war in 1951 would undermine its attempts to raise money to pay for increased US militarisation • The US did begin peace talks with China and North Korea but the war and the negotiations continued for another two years. Extract 2 • The responsibility for the prolonged stalemate in negotiations in Korea should be shared between both sides in the war • Neither the Truman administration nor the Soviets were totally sure that they wanted the war to come to an end • Concessions made by the Communists were seen as a sign of weakness by the US leading to more demands • Negotiations were hampered by a rolling process of bad-tempered claims and counter claims. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that the USA was to blame for the stalemate in Korean peace negotiations in the years 1951-53. Relevant points may include: • Many in the Truman administration saw the continuation of the Korean War as the perfect opportunity to ensure that a military budget would be passed to enable military expansion under NSC-68 • The US was determined to portray itself as the moral victor in a war that was started by the North Korean invasion of South Korea and wanted to set its own terms for peace, not accept peace terms from the Communists • The Soviet terms, rejected in June 1951, suggested a return almost to the position of 1950 and dropped Sino-North Korean demands such as US troop evacuation and the recognition of Communist China in the UN • The nature of the fighting in Korea after June 1951, mainly artillery warfare along an established front combined with aerial bombardment of North Korea, gave the US little incentive to bring the war to a quick end.

Question	Indicative content
	Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that the USA was to blame for the stalemate in Korean peace negotiations in the years 1951-53. Relevant points may include: • After 1951, the likelihood of the war expanding into a global conflagration seemed increasingly unlikely and so all sides were willing to hold out for the terms and conditions they wanted • The Russians, who had little direct involvement in the war, hoped that continued conflict would distract the US from Europe and China believed that continued Chinese involvement was useful training for the Red Army • At various times over the two years of negotiations, both sides found reasons for talks to founder, e.g. over US incursions, POWs, accusations of the use of 'germ' warfare • Despite the devastation being wreaked, the leaders of both North and South Korea at times seemed reluctant to accept peace terms without appearing victorious, e.g. both were reluctant to accept the 1951 terms.

Section B: Indicative content

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement the extent to which the nature of US involvement in Vietnam changed in the years 1954-68. Arguments and evidence that the nature of US involvement in Vietnam changed in the years 1954-68 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • By 1963, the number of US advisers to South Vietnam had expanded from c1000 to c16000 and the role of MAAG had become more than just advisory • Under President Kennedy, the US moved from supplying military resources to South Vietnam to the covert deployment of special forces and the use of US pilots to destroy North Vietnamese aircraft over South Vietnam • In 1963, having previously given diplomatic support to the Diem government in South Vietnam, President Kennedy agreed support for regime change in South Vietnam • From 1964, the US became involved in actions against North Vietnam itself; firstly, using covert action and then using direct bombing, e.g. Operation Rolling Thunder (February 1965) • In June 1965, with the support of Congress, the US committed itself to the open deployment of ground forces on South Vietnamese soil. Arguments and evidence that the nature of US involvement in Vietnam did not change in the years 1954-68 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The US government remained committed to providing the services of military advisers to South Vietnam throughout of the period, e.g. the use of MAAG • Throughout the period, US Presidents remained committed to supporting an anti-communist government in South Vietnam and equipping and training the South Vietnamese military to maintain its own security • The US provided economic guidance and support for the South Vietnamese government throughout the period, e.g. financial support, economic aid programmes, financing the Strategic Hamlets Program • Throughout the period, the US used its position on the UN Security Council to prevent international debate on its role in Vietnam and had no recourse to UN diplomacy to help resolve the situation • US policy throughout was defined as defensive in support of South Vietnam and not as a conflict against North Vietnam; no ground forces were officially deployed against North Vietnam. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on extent to which the success of Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) in gaining control over Cambodia in 1975 was due to Communist Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge. Arguments and evidence that the success of Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) in gaining control over Cambodia in 1975 was due to Communist Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Both Pol Pot (Saloth Sar), as an individual, and the Khmer Rouge, as an organisation, had long-term support and guidance from Chinese Communist leaders and the Chinese Communist Party • Maoist China provided the ideological underpinning to Pol Pot's specific vision of the Communist Cambodia he wanted to create, and which gained the support of many people in Cambodia before 1975 • Communist China provided direct military aid to the Khmer Rouge in the form of training and resources; the largest proportion of external aid to the Khmer Rouge came from the Chinese • Communist China was instrumental in encouraging and materially supporting the alliance (GRUNK) between the Khmer Rouge and Prince Sihanouk against the new Cambodian government from 1970 • In 1975, Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) was only able to consolidate his initial take-over, without having to face external intervention, because of the diplomatic support given to him by Communist China. Arguments and evidence that the success of Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) in gaining control over Cambodia in 1975 was due to other factors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The strength of support for Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) and the Khmer Rouge amongst peasants and discriminated-against ethnic minority groups in the countryside • The sheer determination and ideological belief of Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) and the Khmer Rouge to take control of the government of Cambodia • The impact of the US intervention in Cambodia as part of the Vietnam War: the Khmer Rouge were able to win the civil war that broke out partly in response to devastation caused by US bombing • The military intervention of communist North Vietnam in 1970, after the coup against Sihanouk, allowed the Khmer Rouge to establish a stronghold in north-east Cambodia from which they could gain victory • The impact of the alliance between the Khmer Rouge and Prince Sihanouk after 1970: the alliance (GRUNK) gave support to the Khmer Rouge from previously alienated royalist peasants and urban supporters of Sihanouk • The weakness of the Lon Nol government after his coup of 1970 and the descent into civil war. Other relevant material must be credited.

